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NOT SO FAST: I HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF MY RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Griffin1 
(decided April 2, 2013) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment2 of the United States Constitution pro-
vides the accused with the right to assistance of counsel for his or her 
defense in all criminal trials.3  In People v. Griffin, the New York 
Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of whether the defendant for-
feited his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel when he 
pled guilty to two counts of robbery.4  The heart of the matter in this 
case arose from the trial court’s interference with the attorney-client 
relationship when it dismissed Defendant’s counsel, the Legal Aid 
Society.5  The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First 
Department held that interference with an attorney-client relationship 
had the possibility of upsetting the framework of the trial process.6  
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s 
decision and held that choice of counsel and right to counsel claims 
were close enough because a deprivation of counsel error can affect a 
person’s choice of counsel.7  Since the deprivation of counsel error 
affected the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel, the right to 
counsel claim was not forfeited by the guilty plea.8 
 
1 987 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 2013). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 Id. 
4 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 283. 
5 Id. at 284. 
6 People v. Griffin, 934 N.Y.S.2d 393, 398 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011). 
7 See Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285-86 (reasoning that the Gonzalez-Lopez analysis applies in 
this case because the deprivation of counsel claim can affect the right to choice of counsel). 
8 Id. at 286. 
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The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s 
deprivation of counsel claim was analogous to the constitutional right 
to counsel and survived a guilty plea.9  The court relied on the Su-
preme Court’s decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,10 where 
the Court stated, “the choice of attorney will affect whether and on 
what terms the defendant cooperates with the prosecution, plea bar-
gains, or decides instead to go to trial.”11  A deprivation of counsel 
error can have a great effect on the outcome of a trial because all 
lawyers pursue different strategies that can lead to different results.12  
If a defendant is deprived of counsel, he then loses the opportunity to 
provide himself with a defense of his choosing, and this can lead to a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation.13 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The defendant, Anthony Griffin, was charged with first-
degree robbery and attempted first-degree robbery.14  In the five-
month period following arraignment on the robbery charges, there 
were multiple adjournments requested by both the district attorneys 
and the Legal Aid Society.15  The court granted an adjournment to the 
People for the assignment of a new Assistant District Attorney; in 
one instance, the court even granted an adjournment when the ADA 
admittedly had not yet met with all of the witnesses.16 
On another occasion, when the case was set for hearing and 
trial, the ADA stated that the People were not ready and asked for 
another adjournment.17  At the same time, Legal Aid counsel in-
formed the trial court that its attorney would be leaving the Legal Aid 
Society, and requested a control date so a new Legal Aid attorney 
could be assigned.18  The trial court declined the request for the con-
trol date and requested the assignment of another attorney for the trial 
 
9 Id. at 285. 
10 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
11 Id. at 150 (stating the choice of attorney is crucial in the trial process because every at-
torney has a different strategy that can dramatically affect the outcome of a trial). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 283. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 4, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/18
2014] DEPRIVED OF MY RIGHT TO COUNSEL 1201 
slated to take place in fifteen days.19 
The Legal Aid Society argued for an adjournment because it 
was not going to be ready for trial due to the nature of the case and 
the fact that the defendant was a persistent felon.20  Furthermore, Le-
gal Aid added, “if the court believed they should be relieved, then the 
court should go right ahead and relieve them.”21  The court rejected 
the request for an adjournment and relieved Legal Aid as counsel.22 
After the assignment of 18-B counsel to the defendant, the 
case was reassigned to another judge.23  The defendant pled guilty to 
first-degree robbery and first-degree attempted robbery for a sentence 
of concurrent terms of twenty years to life.24  The defendant filed two 
pro se motions seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and to have new 
counsel assigned to him.25  The court denied the motions and pro-
ceeded with the sentencing.26 
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First 
Department, in a 3-2 decision, reversed the conviction and remanded 
the case, holding the discharge of the defendant’s Legal Aid counsel 
without consulting the defendant interfered with his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.27  The appellate court found both parties were 
treated differently, especially when the People enjoyed the accom-
modation of numerous adjournments.28 
 
 
 
 
19 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 283. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 283-84. 
23 Id. at 284. 
24 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 284. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  The dissent in People v. Griffin, 934 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011) ar-
gued regardless of the broad discretion exercised in the handling of the calendar, the trial 
court properly relieved the Legal Aid Society and did not interfere with the attorney-client 
relationship.  Griffin, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (Sweeny, J., dissenting).  The dissent based its 
conclusion on the fact that after the Legal Aid was relieved, Defendant entered the plea 
agreement with the assistance of his assigned 18-B counsel.  Id. at 400.  Thus, according to 
the dissent, there was no improper removal of the Legal Aid attorney or an interference with 
the attorney-client relationship; if the deprivation of counsel error violated Defendant’s right 
to choice of counsel, it was cured by the assignment of 18-B counsel.  Id. at 399. 
3
Arroyo: Deprived of My Right to Counsel
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
1202 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
III. ISSUES IN GRIFFIN THAT LED THE COURT OF APPEALS TO 
APPLY THE GONZALEZ-LOPEZ RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF 
CHOICE ANALYSIS 
In affirming the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals ex-
amined a set of issues that, together, determined whether interference 
with the attorney-client relationship was sufficient grounds for a dep-
rivation of counsel claim to survive a guilty plea.29  The first issue 
was whether a deprivation of counsel claim was forfeited by a guilty 
plea.30  The second most crucial issue was whether judicial interfer-
ence with an attorney-client relationship was justified.31  Finally, the 
court was obliged to draw a distinction between a deprivation of 
counsel claim and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.32 
First, the Court of Appeals looked at the overall issue of 
whether the defendant’s deprivation of counsel claim was forfeited 
when he pled guilty.33  In determining that it was not, the court relied 
on People v. Taylor,34 which clearly pointed out there is no estab-
lished rule to determine when a claim is waived.35  Rather, the court 
must look to whether the claim is related to a factual matter or a fun-
damental matter that can affect the trial process.36  People v. Hansen37 
explained that “[t]he critical distinction is between defects implicat-
ing the integrity of the process, which may survive a guilty plea, and 
less fundamental flaws, such as evidentiary or technical matters, 
which do not.”38  Thus, certain claims have the potential to survive a 
guilty plea, especially claims that are intertwined with the integrity of 
the criminal justice system and affect the constitutional rights of a de-
fendant.39  Since the defendant’s constitutional rights were affected, 
 
29 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d 284 (examining three issues that eventually led the court to analyze 
the scope of the judicial interference with the attorney-client relationship). 
30 Id. at 284. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 285. 
33 Id. at 284. 
34 478 N.E.2d 755 (N.Y. 1985). 
35 Id. at 757. 
36 Id. 
37 738 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 2000). 
38 Id. at 776 (pointing out that a defect or error has to be of such magnitude that it affects 
the integrity of the trial process, in order for it to possibly reverse a guilty plea). 
39 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 284.  The Court of Appeals rejected the People’s notion that 
Gonzalez-Lopez only applies to defendants who finance their own counsel or are not as-
signed counsel.  Id. at 285.  The Griffin court reasons, “the right to counsel claim is inextri-
cably intertwined with claims of different treatment in a way that we believe meaningfully 
4
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the court then analyzed whether the judicial interference with the at-
torney-client relationship was justified.40 
Second, the Court of Appeals examined the most critical issue 
at trial, which was whether the trial court’s interference with the at-
torney-client relationship was justified.41  This was an issue because 
“courts cannot arbitrarily interfere with the attorney-client relation-
ship, and interference with that relationship for purpose of case man-
agement is not without limits, and is subject to scrutiny.”42  Further-
more, judicial interference with an attorney-client relationship, by a 
removal of counsel that disparately impacts defense counsel, goes to 
the fundamental fairness of the system of justice.43  Even though the 
removal of the Legal Aid Society in Griffin was due to concerns 
about the efficient administration of the criminal justice system, 
courts may still face some scrutiny if there is interference with the at-
torney-client relationship.44 
The court’s interference with the attorney-client relationship 
was scrutinized in People v. Knowles,45 when the trial court refused 
to permit an additional Legal Aid attorney to cross-examine a witness 
and sit at the defense table.46  The trial court justified its denial of 
counsel by claiming that the defendant, a black male, was trying to 
gain a strategic advantage with the jury by having a black female at-
torney.47  Denying the defendant the assistance of the additional at-
torney opened up the discussion of whether the judicial interference 
with the attorney-client relationship affected the defendant’s right to 
choice of counsel.48  The trial court could not support its ruling with 
any findings of delay or disruptions of proceedings, conflict of inter-
 
places it outside the sphere of claims forfeited by a guilty plea, and implicates the entire 
criminal justice system.”  Id. at 286 n.2.  This is how the Court of Appeals is able to apply 
Gonzalez-Lopez when the Defendant was assigned counsel. 
40 Id. at 284-85. 
41 Id. at 284. 
42 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 284. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (citing People v. Knowles, 673 N.E.2d 902 (N.Y. 1996), and explaining that judicial 
interference with an attorney-client relationship for the purpose of case management is still 
subject to scrutiny). 
45 673 N.E.2d 902, 907 (N.Y. 1996) (reasoning that racial discrimination is never a valid 
basis to support the trial judge’s discretion in declining the addition of a second attorney). 
46 Id. at 903. 
47 Id. at 904. 
48 Id. at 904-05. 
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est, or prejudice to the prosecution or defense.49  Thus, the Court of 
Appeals held that the trial court’s exclusion of the attorney was arbi-
trary and was an abuse of discretion because there was no rational ba-
sis to support the ruling.50 
Finally, the Court of Appeals handled the issue of whether 
deprivation of counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
had the same legal equivalence with respect to the defendant’s plea.51  
The Court of Appeals distinguished the two claims by comparing the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in People v. Petgen52 to the 
deprivation of choice of counsel claim in Griffin.53 
In Petgen, the defendant, with his new attorney, was forced to 
file an untimely application for permission to file a motion to sup-
press evidence because his original attorney did not respond to the 
prosecution’s notice of intention to offer evidence.54  The trial judge 
denied the defendant’s application.55  The defendant claimed that this 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel claim that should have 
survived his guilty plea.56  Because his new attorney was aware of the 
ineffectiveness of the previous counsel, the right to appellate review 
was forfeited.57  The court reasoned that the application for permis-
sion to file a motion and a motion to suppress evidence should be 
treated differently.58  The application for permission to file a motion 
was based on whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to 
file the motion on time; it was not based on the denial of merits of 
constitutional contentions that a motion to suppress evidence would 
be.59  Thus, the court concluded that the ineffectiveness of counsel 
claim did not infect the plea and the claim could not survive the 
guilty plea.60 
In contrast, the deprivation of counsel in Griffin infected the 
 
49 Id. at 905. 
50 Knowles, 673 N.E.2d at 906. 
51 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285. 
52 435 N.E.2d 669 (N.Y. 1982). 
53 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285.  The Court of Appeals rejects the People’s application of 
Petgen because the deprivation of counsel infected the guilty plea in Griffin.  Id.  In contrast, 
the ineffective assistance of counsel in Petgen did not infect the plea.  Id. 
54 Petgen, 435 N.E.2d at 670. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 669. 
57 Id. at 671. 
58 Id. at 670. 
59 Petgen, 435 N.E.2d at 670. 
60 Id. at 670-71. 
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plea and the plea bargaining process, both of which the Legal Aid 
Society was actively engaged in prior to its removal.61  This is why 
the court in Griffin drew a distinction between the ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim in Petgen and the deprivation of counsel claim 
in Griffin.62  Therefore, after analyzing this issue, the court in Griffin 
was able to determine the significance of the choice of counsel in the 
plea process, and apply the Gonzalez-Lopez analysis.63 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE OF GONZALEZ-LOPEZ IN GRIFFIN 
In examining whether the removal of Legal Aid without con-
sulting with the defendant in Griffin interfered with his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, the Court of Appeals relied on United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, which emphasized that the choice of attor-
ney can have a great effect on the outcome of a trial.64  In Gonzalez-
Lopez, the United States Supreme Court held that an erroneous dis-
qualification of counsel error that violates the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel does warrant a conviction reversal because the error is a 
“structural defect.”65 
The defendant in Gonzalez-Lopez was charged with conspira-
cy to distribute one hundred kilograms of marijuana.66  The defend-
ant’s family hired an attorney, and after the arraignment, the defend-
ant hired a second attorney to represent him in addition to his original 
attorney.67  The trial court provisionally allowed the participation of 
the second attorney.68  The second attorney violated a court rule, and 
the court removed him from the trial.69  The defendant’s original at-
torney filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as well as a motion for 
sanctions against the second attorney.70  The defendant, left with no 
attorney, hired a local attorney.71 
In essence, the Court was concerned with how the trial court’s 
 
61 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 142. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142. 
70 Id. at 142-43. 
71 Id. at 143. 
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application of the court rules affected the defendant’s right to choice 
of counsel.72  While the trial court was within its discretion in using 
the court rules to discipline the second attorney, enforcement of the 
court rules by the trial court interfered with the defendant’s right to 
choice of counsel.73  The Court then had to determine whether the in-
terference could potentially affect the framework of the trial pro-
cess.74  If it did, the error would constitute a “structural defect,” 
which would not require a showing of prejudice by the defendant.75  
Moreover, the error would not be subject to a “harmless error” analy-
sis.76 
V. WHAT IS A “STRUCTURAL DEFECT” ERROR? 
Constitutional errors are divided into two categories.77  The 
first error is a “trial error,” which occurs during the presentation of 
the case to the jury.78  These errors can be assessed collectively to de-
termine if they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.79  The se-
cond type of error is called a “structural defect,” which affects the 
framework in which the trial proceeds.80  Erroneous deprivation of 
counsel that interferes with a defendant’s right to choice of counsel is 
a structural defect because attorneys have differing strategies that can 
take a trial in many different directions, thus, drastically affecting the 
outcome of a trial.81 
When the right to be assisted by counsel of choice is wrongly 
denied, the court must first determine if it should review the error for 
harmlessness.82  In order to determine whether an error is reviewable 
for harmlessness, the court must determine what category the consti-
 
72 Id. at 148.  “Deprivation of the right is ‘complete’ when the defendant is erroneously 
prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the 
representation he received.”  Id. 
73 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152. 
74 Id. at 150. 
75 Id. at 148.  “These ‘defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards’ because they ‘affec[t] 
the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ and are not ‘simply an error in the trial pro-
cess itself.’ ”  Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 150. 
82 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148. 
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tutional error falls into.83  If there is a structural defect, it will cir-
cumvent the harmlessness analysis because interference with the right 
to counsel can greatly affect the framework of the trial process.84  
Hence, a defendant does not have to show prejudice when there is a 
structural defect error because it would be unsound for courts to re-
view counsel strategies and trial outcomes in the alternative.85  There-
fore, in situations where the deprivation of counsel by a court inter-
feres with an attorney-client relationship or the right to choice of 
counsel, the defendant will not have the burden of showing prejudice. 
If there is a structural defect error that affects the framework 
of the trial process, the court can provide justification for such an er-
ror.  To the contrary, the trial court in United States v. Smith86 was 
unable to justify the structural defect error when the defendant asked 
to substitute his attorney.87  The substitute attorney informed the 
court that he would not be able to make the trial date due to a racket-
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 148-49. 
85 Id. at 150. 
The Government acknowledges that the deprivation of choice of counsel 
pervades the entire trial, but points out that counsel's ineffectiveness may 
also do so and yet we do not allow reversal of a conviction for that rea-
son without a showing of prejudice.  But the requirement of showing 
prejudice in ineffectiveness claims stems from the very definition of the 
right at issue; it is not a matter of showing that the violation was harm-
less, but of showing that a violation of the right to effective representa-
tion occurred.  A choice-of-counsel violation occurs whenever the de-
fendant's choice is wrongfully denied.  Moreover, if and when counsel's 
ineffectiveness “pervades” a trial, it does so (to the extent we can detect 
it) through identifiable mistakes.  We can assess how those mistakes af-
fected the outcome.  To determine the effect of wrongful denial of 
choice of counsel, however, we would not be looking for mistakes com-
mitted by the actual counsel, but for differences in the defense that 
would have been made by the rejected counsel—in matters ranging from 
questions asked on voir dire and cross-examination to such intangibles 
as argument style and relationship with the prosecutors.  We would have 
to speculate upon what matters the rejected counsel would have handled 
differently—or indeed, would have handled the same but with the bene-
fit of a more jury-pleasing courtroom style or a longstanding relationship 
of trust with the prosecutors.  And then we would have to speculate upon 
what effect those different choices or different intangibles might have 
had.  The difficulties of conducting the two assessments of prejudice are 
not remotely comparable. 
Id. at 150-51. 
86 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010). 
87 Id. at 659. 
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eering trial that would last several months.88  The trial court denied 
the motion to substitute counsel and appointed an attorney for the de-
fendant.89  The defendant was also denied the assistance of his origi-
nal attorney.90  Eventually, the defendant pled guilty with the assis-
tance of a court appointed attorney.91 
It is apparent in Smith that in order for a Sixth Amendment 
claim to survive a guilty plea, the defendant must first show that his 
substantial rights were affected when he was deprived of counsel.92  
The deprivation of counsel error must have a significant effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings.93  The defendant in Smith was deprived 
of the counsel of his choice when the court denied him his substitu-
tion of counsel motion.94  The trial court could not justify that it was 
balancing the rights to counsel of choice and the needs for fairness 
against the calendar because there was no trial date on schedule at the 
time.95  Moreover, the defendant was not trying to manipulate the 
schedule because a trial date was not yet set.96  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the deprivation of counsel was a structural defect error 
and that the defendant’s guilty plea was withdrawn.97 
VI. EXCEPTIONS TO THE “STRUCTURAL DEFECT” ERROR 
Courts can interfere with an attorney-client relationship in the 
name of trial management when there is a possibility of a conflict of 
interest or when there is a possibility of a delay in proceedings.98  
Similarly, in New York, the courts have recognized these exceptions 
as stated in Knowles: 
Accordingly, judicial interference with an established 
 
88 Id. at 660. 
89 Id. at 661. 
90 Id. 
91 Smith, 618 F.3d at 662. 
92 Id. at 664 (concluding that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel). 
93 Id. at 666.  It is noted on the record that the trial court said the defendant did not have a 
right to choice of counsel, he only had a right of counsel.  Id.  Since this is inconsistent with 
Gonzalez-Lopez, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals believes that the trial court did not 
give sufficient consideration to the right to choice of counsel.  Id. 
94 Smith, 618 F.3d at 661. 
95 Id. at 666. 
96 Id. at 666-67. 
97 Id. at 667. 
98 Knowles, 673 N.E.2d at 905. 
10
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attorney-client relationship in the name of trial man-
agement may be tolerable only where the court first 
determines that counsel’s participation presents a con-
flict of interest or where defense tactics may compro-
mise the orderly management of the trial or the fair 
administration of justice.99 
Additionally, the court can also justify its interference by 
showing prejudice to the prosecution or the defense.100  Therefore, on 
the New York and federal levels, there exist exceptions that can justi-
fy judicial interference with the attorney-client relationship. 
United States v. Sanchez Guerrero101 examines the conflict of 
interest exception.  In Sanchez Guerrero, the defendant was indicted 
for conspiring with others to distribute cocaine and marijuana and 
shared the same attorney as his co-conspirators.102  The defendant 
was also later indicted for possession of a firearm as a felon and en-
gaging in a RICO conspiracy.103  The district court disqualified the 
defendant’s defense counsel because of a conflict of interest.104  The 
attorney was disqualified because he represented Guerrero, Guerre-
ro’s brother, and a witness as co-defendants.105  The defendant ulti-
mately pled guilty to the RICO charge.106  In his plea agreement, the 
defendant did not preserve any of his rights to appeal and he waived 
his right to appeal any sentencing issues.107  The defendant then ap-
pealed his conviction and claimed his counsel should not have been 
disqualified.108 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Gonzalez-
Lopez rationale, even though the Sanchez Guerrero case involved a 
guilty plea as opposed to a trial.109  Because choice of counsel seri-
ously impacted the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, disqualifica-
 
99 Id. at 904. 
100 Id. 
101 546 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2008). 
102 Id. at 330. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 331. 
105 Id. 
106 Sanchez Guerrero, 546 F.3d at 331. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 332.  “If a defendant is erroneously denied the counsel of his choice, it is a struc-
tural error in the trial that brings into question the voluntary and intelligent character of the 
guilty plea itself.”  Id. 
11
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tion of counsel, in this case, was considered a “structural error.”110 
Citing a conflict of interest as a reason for disqualifying the 
defendant’s counsel, the federal district court reasoned a conflict of 
interest would have still existed even if the disqualified counsel hired 
an attorney to cross-examine the witness he was representing.111  Alt-
hough the trial court interfered with the attorney-client relationship, 
the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
disqualifying counsel because there was an actual conflict of interest 
in the case.112  Thus, in instances of conflicts of interest, a court’s in-
terference with an attorney-client relationship must strike a balance 
between the rights of the parties involved and the appearance of fair-
ness in a trial.113 
The other exception of compromising the orderly manage-
ment of trial and the fair administration of justice was evident in 
United States v. Konstantin,114 when the defendant, displeased with 
his counsel, was denied an adjournment that would have allowed him 
to seek new counsel.115  The defendant requested an adjournment to 
postpone his trial.116  The defendant wanted to discharge his current 
counsel and postpone the trial for another week, when his counsel of 
choice would be available.117  The trial court denied the defendant’s 
request for adjournment citing reasons of scheduling.118 
The United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court’s decision and reasoned a trial court has wide latitude 
in balancing the right of choice of counsel against the demands of its 
calendar.119  It is obvious that the defendant had an attorney-client re-
lationship because the defendant’s knowledge of his purported new 
counsel’s trial availability.120  The trial court’s interference with the 
attorney-client relationship, in this case, was justified because there 
was the possibility the proceedings would be delayed if the adjourn-
 
110 Id. 
111 Sanchez Guerrero, 546 F.3d at 334. 
112 Id. at 334-35. 
113 Id. at 333. 
114 280 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2008). 
115 Id. at 55. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Konstantin, 280 F. App’x at 55. 
120 Id. 
12
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ment were granted to the defendant.121  Furthermore, it was also rea-
sonable to surmise that granting the trial adjournment would preju-
dice the prosecution because they would have very little time to ad-
just their tactics to a new defense attorney’s strategies.122 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The defendant in Griffin was prejudiced when the trial court 
granted adjournments to the People.123  Even though the trial court 
had wide latitude of discretion in managing its calendar, the ad-
journments to the People still deprived the defendant of his right to 
counsel.124  In this situation, the interference with the attorney-client 
relationship for case management purposes was subject to scrutiny.125  
Legal Aid was very active in the plea bargaining process, and this 
was sufficent to establish an interference with the attorney-client rela-
tionship.126  The judicial interference had such an effect on the fair-
ness of the trial process that the defendant’s right to counsel claim 
survived his guilty plea.127 
Errors affecting constitutional rights, such as violations of a 
defendant’s right to counsel, may survive a guilty plea because they 
go to the very heart of the trial process.128  The New York courts have 
two categories for these constitutional errors.129  An error such as 
deprivation of counsel that interferes with an attorney-client relation-
ship that affects the right to choice of counsel and could compromise 
the integrity of the trial process is an error that has the capability of 
reversing a guilty plea.130  On the other hand, “less fundamental 
 
121 Id. 
122 Id. (stating that these types of cases normally do not require a forensic account).  
Bringing in a new attorney as well as a forensic expert under such short notice can prejudice 
the prosecution.  Konstantin does not discuss the prejudice to the prosecution if the motion to 
substitute counsel would have been allowed, but it seems to be implied in the case. 
123 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 283. 
124 Id. at 284. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 285. 
127 Id. 
128 Hansen, 738 N.E.2d at 776. 
129 Id.  “The critical distinction is between defects implicating the integrity of the process, 
which may survive a guilty plea, and less fundamental flaws, such as evidentiary or technical 
matters, which do not.”  Id. 
130 Id. at 777 (implying that the defendant’s claim did not survive the guilty plea because 
the trial error did not affect the heart of the trial process). 
13
Arroyo: Deprived of My Right to Counsel
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
1212 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
flaws” like evidentiary or technical matters, do not compromise the 
integrity of the process and are forfeited by a guilty plea.131 
The New York and federal courts employ the same process in 
determining whether a deprivation of counsel claim survives a guilty 
plea.132  Interference with the attorney-client relationship is the criti-
cal component in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel analysis.133  
New York and federal courts categorically label their constitutional 
errors that affect trials in the same fashion.134  Therefore, in employ-
ing the same analysis for Sixth Amendment right to counsel viola-
tions, both courts are able to properly evaluate whether such claims 
can survive a guilty plea. 
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131 Id. 
132 Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285. 
133 Id. at 284. 
134 Id.; Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148. 
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